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What Is the Relation
between Public Pensions
and Private Savings?
P

ension systems where current
pension benefits are financed by current
revenues, also known as pay-as-you-go
systems, are vulnerable to demographic
changes such as increased longevity and
declining fertility. In part because of
lower birth rates in the United States, a
2014 Social Security Board of Trustees
report projects that by 2033, the costs of
Social Security programs will increase
so that revenues will pay for only about
77 percent of scheduled benefits (U.S.
Government Printing Office 2014).
To deal with such demographic
changes, over the past 20 years many
European countries, including Italy,
Poland, Sweden, and Germany, have
reformed their pension systems (see,
for example, Szczepański and Turner
[2014]). A common theme of pension
reforms has been to change the design
of future pensions in order to encourage
people to work longer and save more
for retirement. Such reforms provide
an opportunity to estimate whether, in
response to lower future pensions, people
save more on their own, or, equivalently,
to answer whether pay-as-you-go public
pensions crowd out private saving. The
public pension crowd-out is an important
policy parameter, because it tells us how
much people would save on their own if
Social Security benefits were lowered.

The 1999 Pension Reform
To answer whether public pensions
crowd out private saving, in a recent
Upjohn Institute working paper,
Lachowska and Myck (2015) study
Poland’s 1999 pension reform, which
created a setting similar to a “quasiexperiment.” The reform lowered future
pension benefits but had a different
impact on individuals, depending on their
year of birth. Individuals who were older
than 50 at the time of the reform were not
directly affected. However, those who
were between 30 and 50 years old at the
time of the reform will receive pension
benefits computed according to a less
generous postreform pension formula.
Figure 1 shows the median
replacement rate, defined as the ratio of
the first pension benefit of the head of
household to his or her last preretirement
salary, before and after the reform for the
cohorts affected and unaffected by the
reform. Prior to the reform, many could
expect a replacement rate of about 60
percent. After the reform, the replacement
rate for the cohorts unaffected directly by
the reform remained the same; however,
the replacement rate for the cohorts
affected by the reform fell by about 20
percentage points. We use the arbitrarily
set cutoff at age 50 to identify whether
this drop in pension generosity led to an
increase in the private saving rate.
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Figure 1 Median Replacement Rate Before and After the Pension Reform
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NOTE: Replacement rate is defined as the ratio of first gross pension benefit to last gross salary of
the head of the household.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BBGD 1998 and 1999.

We want to stress that this quasiexperimental variation is valuable
because a person’s future pension
benefits depend on one’s earnings, and
the determinants of earnings are in
turn likely to be correlated with how
much one saves. Hence, because of
unaccounted-for confounding factors that
affect both earnings and savings, simply
comparing the savings of somebody
with a high future pension to the savings
of somebody with a low future pension
may not isolate the effect of pension
on saving. However, by comparing the
saving rate before and after the reform
and across similarly aged people—some
of whom were affected by the reform
and some of whom were not—we can
identify the effect of the change in
pension generosity on the saving rate.
Methods
To estimate the responsiveness of
private savings to pensions, we use
data from the Polish Household Budget
Surveys for years 1997–2003. We begin
by estimating multiyear “differencein-differences” regressions comparing

2

household saving before and after the
1999 reform for the cohorts affected
and unaffected by the reform. These
comparisons tell us how much the
saving rate changed because of the
reform. In a second step, we estimate
the change in PLN (Poland’s currency)
of the private saving rate for a change
of 1 PLN in pension wealth—that is, the
public pension crowd-out. To do this,
we compute what the pension wealth
would have been under the prereform
and postreform legislation and relate this
variable to saving. As before, we use
the fact that the 1999 pension reform
changed the amount that similarly aged
people could expect to receive in public
pensions.
Figure 2 shows the point estimates
from a multiyear difference-indifferences regression using the saving
rate as the dependent variable. The point
estimates show the difference in the
saving rate of the households affected
by the reform relative to the saving
rate of households unaffected by the
reform and relative to year 1998—the
year preceding the pension reform. In
order to interpret the point estimates

as effects of the reform on the saving
rate, we should not see any statistically
significant differences in the rate between
the households affected or unaffected
by the reform in the years preceding
the reform. If we do, we would worry
about preexisting group and time trends
in saving rates that would confound the
estimated effect of the reform. However,
in the years following the reform, we
expect to see an increase in the saving
rate of the households whose expected
pensions were reduced by the reform.
We see from Figure 2 that in 1997,
relative to the unaffected households
and relative to the year 1998, there was
no statistical difference in the saving
rate of the cohorts later affected by the
reform. That the saving rate in 1997 is
not different for the cohorts affected
and unaffected by the 1999 reform
strengthens our claim that differences
in the saving rate between the cohorts
observed after 1999 really are an effect
of the reform. The saving rate tends to
increase over time in the years following
the reform for the cohorts whose pensions
were reduced relative to the cohorts
who were unaffected by the reform and
relative to the prereform saving rate.
This suggests an effect of the reform in
the expected direction. The magnitude of
the estimated effects on the saving rate
in Figure 2 is between 0 and less than
5 percentage points, which is a large
increase, given that the average saving
rate in our data is about 2 percent and the
median saving rate is about 9 percent.
Key Findings
How does the change in the saving
rate reported in Figure 2 relate to the
degree of public pension crowd-out?
In our working paper (Lachowska and
Myck 2015), we report the following key
findings:
 Our analysis shows that public
pension crowds out private saving by
about 0.24 PLN for each 1 PLN.
 For older cohorts (born between
1949 and 1953), middle-aged cohorts
(born between 1954 and 1968), and
people with a higher education, we find a
large and statistically significant crowdout ranging between 0.45 and 1.0, which
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to the predictions of the classical
life-cycle model; therefore, limited
financial literacy should be taken into
consideration when designing pension
reforms.

Figure 2 Estimated Effect of the 1999 Pension Reform on Saving Rate
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1. For example, Attanasio and Brugiavini
(2003) report a range of effects between 0.30
and 0.70; Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003)
report the crowd-out to be between 0.65
and 0.75; and Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula
(2006) estimate it to be 0.70.
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NOTE: The figure shows point estimates from a multiyear difference-in-differences regression of
saving rate on an indicator for whether the household is affected by the reform, i.e., whether the
household is “treated,” six-year dummies, and an interaction term between the year dummies and
the “treated” dummy. The figure presents the interaction point estimates over time. The omitted
categories are year 1998 (the year just before the reform) and the cohort born 1937–1948 (the
cohort unaffected directly by the reform). The regression uses robust standard errors clustered
by year of birth, and the figure presents 95 percent confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line
indicates the first year of the reform.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BBGD.

implies that, for these groups, private
saving and pensions are close to perfect
substitutes.
 Younger cohorts (born after 1968)
and lower-educated households display
much smaller public pension crowd-out.
Policy Implications
A crowd-out of 0.24 suggests that
public pensions displace a sizable
part—about one-quarter—of private
savings. However, compared to other
recent studies, our estimate of crowdout is at the lower end of the range of
existing estimates.1 Also, our subsample
analysis reveals that this crowd-out is
not uniformly distributed in society, but
rather is concentrated among certain
types of households. If the goal of
pension reforms is to increase private
saving, policymakers should be aware of
the heterogeneity in the responsiveness

of saving to pension reforms. Simply put,
some households might increase their
saving in response to benefit cuts, while
other households might not save enough.
We speculate that the nonresponse
among the younger households could be
due to liquidity constraints, incomplete
information, or uncertainty about how
enduring the 1999 reform would be.
For young people, building up a stock
of wealth might simply be a question
of time, and as they age they may
accumulate more saving. However, the
lack of a savings response observed
for the less-educated households is
worrisome and echoes the findings of the
financial literacy literature. The concern
is that by remaining passive and not
adjusting their saving, these households
are at risk of having a low standard
of living in retirement. One policy
conclusion from the passive behavior
of the low-educated households is that
all households do not behave according
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